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The terms-of trade myth and development strategy
”An excessive pre-occupation with the terms of 
trade is a sign of economic hypochondria” (Kindelberger)
One of the commonest and most durable of eoonomio myths is
that there is a secular deterioration in the terms of trade of
countries which export primary products. Any paper or speech on
the foreign exchange difficulties of the e countries, or on the
increasing inequalities in the world economy, makes a ritual
referenoe to this alleged trend, and a good deal of energy has
gone into attempts to explain why it occurs. It reappears
frequently, for instance at the recent United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development in Geneva.-^
So far as the really long-term trend is concerned, the
proponents of this thesis apparently overlook the detailed
2/analysis made by Theodore Morgan.—' Professor Morgan demonstrated 
that the available data were conflicting; that the unit value 
indices for the trade of the United Kingdom, which were the main 
source for earlier studies ,-^show a different story if taken still
l/ See for example ’’Towards a New Trade Policy for Development",
Report by the Secretary-General of the Conference.
2] "The Long-run Terms of Tr rie 4 aen Agriculture and Manufacturing" 
in Economic Developmeni xtural Changet October 1959
i/ "Industrialization me Fo fraie" (League of Nations, 1945)
and "Relative Prices of x ts and Imports of Under-Developed 
Countries" (United Nati ■< , .949)*
further back to the beginning of the nineteenth century; and 
that these indioes are in any case subject to two major biases, 
both of which work in the same direction. These are (i) that 
qualitative improvements have been more important in manufactures 
than in primary products; and (ii) that, because of falling 
transportation costs, the actual terms of trade facing countries 
exporting primary products have moved more favourably than would 
be shown by indices concocted from prices at United Kingdom ports.
The meaning of series covering a century or so is in any case 
not entirely clear. The structure of the world economy has changed 
so much since the 19th century that the balance of foroes today 
may well be quite diffeient from what was to be found then. No 
single theoretical explanation can be expected to cover the whole 
period. Besides, any series going back so far links together 
index numbers with v?*rious weighting systems, so that its 
interpretation is not easy; and, broadly speaking, the further 
one goes back the worse the quality of the data.
The deterioration in the 1950*s and early 1960*8 gave new 
life to the terms-of-trade thesis. Yet one can hardly build a 
theory on the experience during this particular period. In 1950* 
wartime shortages of primary products still lingered; they persisted 
in fact well into this decade, because, although the supply of 
primary products was improving, this was a period of a fast upward 
trend in incomes in Western Europe. Mo eover, on top of this 
basically favourable situation for commodities came the Korean 
War, which caused a specul . tiv . in the second half of 1950
and for most of 1951*
In the early 1960‘s, on the other hand, the terms of trade 
of primary producers were unusually poor. The growth of Western 
Europe had slowed down; excess capacity oreated in the earlier 
boom had dep2’essed some commodity markets; the prices of cereals 
were affected by the huge United States farm inventories and 
by the United States Government polioy of subsidising exports 
of farm products.
What has been happening is that many economists have been 
mistaking a medium-term for a long-term tendency and have focussed 
their attention on the downward phase of a cycled We can get 
the experience of the post-war years into better perspective by 
looking at data for the period from 1928 to 19^2, a period long 
enough ago to provide some idea of tho trends at work in the middle 
of the twentieth century, but not so long that great conceptual 
or statistical difficulties are raised.
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Table
Terms of trade of non-industrial countries 
_______________ 1928 to 1962________________
(1928 .  100)
. Terms of trade irr\ Export unit Import unit ---------------  (M)
values (X) values (M)
1928 100 100 100
1937-38 69 80 86
1950 188 168 112
1962 176 184 95
l/ Thus the series in th e conference document '‘Handbook of 
International Trad© St. ti all start in 1950
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Souroesi Data for 1962 to 1957* from "Trends in International 
Trade” (GATT, 1958)* were linked to data for 1950 to 
1962 from "Handbook of International Trade Statistics"
(UNCTAD, 1964)> by equating averages for the period 
1955-57• There have been some slight oh nges in 
coverage: "non-induttrial countries” in GATT data
include Finland and Spain, whereas "primary commodity 
exporters” in the UN data do not. (Both series 
include Australia and New Zealand, and exclude Japan 
and Turkey).
All the figures in the table refer to years when the level of 
activity was high in industrial countries. A partial exception was 
1937-3 0 > when the world economy had not fully recovered from the 
great depression.
The table shows that between 1928 and 1962, there was no 
significant change in the terms of trade - a 5% decline is not 
statistically significant, especially if one allows for quality 
improvement in manufactures (a oar of 1964 is generally considered 
an improvement on one of 1928). There has been a rise in commodity 
prices since 1962, and the terms of trade are in 1964 if anything, 
better than three and a half decades ago. It could be argued that 
there were some abnormal factors in the recent rise in commodity 
prices^ but it is normal for commodity markets to be subject to 
abnormal influences.
1/ Judging from the United Kingdom indices, they are also about where 
they were in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.
2/ It may be argued that what are r ally relevant are the terms at 
which primary products exchar c for manufactures, rather than 
the terms of trade of oountr i. 3 which sell mainly primary products. 
This can only be checked 'or icultural products. I,inking 
together series in vari * i of the State of Food and Agriculture
(FAO), it seems that in 1; 62 . terms of trade in this sense were
about 10$ higher than in '2 ,, 1 figure somewhat larger than obtained
from the other method of cl , ition. However recently, prices of 
agricultural produots ros pr-. ticularly fast, and in 1964 the 
terms of trade in this sense are probably also about the same as in 
1928.
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If something has to be explained it is why the terms of 
trade show no noticeable trend over a period covering a world 
slump, a world war and a series of drastic political changes, 
including the winding up of the British and French colonial 
empires and the almost complete isolation from world trade of 
an important group of countries (the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe).
The reason why economists seem to accept the terms of trade 
thesis so unoritioally lies probably in the powerful intellectual 
support this thesis gives to the case for the industrialization 
of underdeveloped countries (and more recently to the case for 
their special treatment in the aid and trade). After all, it 
would obviously be foolish to commit much resources to sectors 
producing goods with a chronically falling real price. This 
looks like a good answer to the naiveties of the static doctrine 
of comparative costs.
Yet to abandon the terms-of-trade thesis as a myth is by 
no means the same thing as abandoning the case for industrialization. 
To get rid of a myth is to strengthen, not weaken, an argument.
We can find some clues in the historical evidence on how to rebuild 
this case, but we have to look at the trends in volumes, not in 
i rices.
The total world consumption of manufactures (excluding the 
Communist countries) rose b i volume between 1928 and 19^0,
whereas the total coneumpti n t ira.ry products ro»-e by 70$
(or 59$ if petroleum is exo>uded)^% These rises are equivalent to 
annual average increases of 3*4$ and. 1.7$ (or 1.4$ excluding 
petroleum). World population rose by about 1*5$ in the same 
period, so the increase per capita in consumption of primary 
products w p very slow (possibly negative if petroleum is excluded). 
In fact calculating inoome-elastioities of demand in the usual way, 
we would obtain about 1.5 for manufactures and less than 0.2 for 
primary products.*^
The gap between these figures looks rather large; income 
elasticities of demand are known to be much higher for (say) 
consumer durables than food, but we would expect a smaller figure 
for manufactures as a whole and a muoh larger one for primary 
products. In the first place, however, we are not referring here 
to consumers’ purchases of food, blit to total consumption of primary 
products. The trend in this is affected by two additional influences, 
the rising amount of processing done on each quantum of physical 
inputs.*1^  Moreover, income has become much more unequally 
distributed in the world during this period, and suoh a development
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i/ oee the Report of the Secretary-Geheral to the Geneva Conference 
(op.oit.) p. 19* These data actually refer to production, but 
since the changes are substantial, inventory movements can be 
ignored, and since the non-Communist world is virtually a 
closed system, so can foreign trade.
'£/ Taking the rise in the total production of primary and secondary 
products (2 .7$ a year) a representative of the trend in income 
in the non-Communist world. Actually, services probably rise 
faster than goods (becau of the expansion of professional, 
military and civil services in the developed countries), so the 
elasticity shown her fo ifactures, may be a little too high.
(The figure for prin ry lucts, being so small, is not very 
sensitive to errors i. t estimated growth of income).
2/ Basically these tend e the same 5 so-called "synthetics”
are simply materials in ioh primary products have already been 
highly processed.
tends to raise the demand for manufactures and reduce that for 
primary products.^
These demand tendencies have been reflected in three shiftsj
(i) in the structure of national eoonomies, towards manufacturing,
(ii) in the structure of world trade, towards manufactures, and
(iii) in the structure of world income, against countries which
have not euooeeded in industrializing their eoonomies to any
2 /significant extent.—'
Whatever the historical evidence, past trends are only relevant 
for policy to the extent that they provide a clue to future prospects. 
The term8-of-trade thesis is roaliy a forecast, when it is uued to 
buttress the oaPe for industrialization. Yet here it se ms 
particularly doubtful. There^will naturally be recessions as in 
the patt, and one thing which experience does indicate is that the 
terms of trade of primary producers do deteriorate whenever there 
is a general decline in activity. (This is in fact one perfectly 
good reason for weighting one's decision in favour of industry in 
development planning). Unless a sensible system of international 
liquidity is established, which looks unlikely, a serious reoeseion 
can reasonably be anticipated in the next few years.
1/ This is because inoome elasticity for food and other primary products 
are apparently not constant but falling with respect to inoome. In 
passing we should note that the forces producing greater inequality 
reinforce each other. The greater the change in the structure of 
world demand in favour of the manufacturing countries, the more 
their inoome rises, and since their inoome ela; tioities of demand 
for manufacturing are particularly high, the more the structure 
of world demand changes in their favour. I have tried to demonstrate 
the inherent tendency to in uality more rigorously in ’'Comparative 
rates of growth in t-E >r. >m; " Economic Journal, March 19^2)
2/ Since the protection c in industrial countries inhibited
the full modification of* ! ir economic structures, the changes in 
the structures of world u * and world inoome we e greater than 
they would have otherwi e m.
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But it is the trend, not the cyclical fluctuation, which is 
really significant for long-term development policy. Are the 
underlying long-term forces such as to turn the trend in the terms 
of trade of primary producers downw rd at lart'* One’s answer can 
be better than a hunch, and mine is that they will be better at 
the end of the century than they are now.-^
In answering such a question, one has to ask one’s self what 
new influence can be expected. Tendencies on the demand side will 
no doubt continue as before - the income elasticities seems fairly 
fundamental. Technical progress will also continue to material-saving 
in itr implications. So the consumption of manufactures will continue 
to outrun that of primary products.
There are two new influences on the supply side. The first is 
the emphasis in development plans on investment in industry, an 
emphasis partly attributable to the terms-of-trade thesis itself. 
(Paradoxically, the more people believe this thesis, the less likely . 
that it will prove correct). This does not only increase the supply 
of manufactures, it also discourages agricultural production. People 
are drawn into the towns and unemployment in the rural areas shrinks, 
so that wages in&griculture rise above subsistence levels-r7
ITWaturally in practice this has to be done for eaoh country separately. 
I amtalking here of general tendencies.
2/ The effect of a change in relative wages oould be offset by a f a ter 
rise in productivity in arioulture than in manufacturing. This 
seems unlikely however, empecially for tropical foods.
There ia in faot some evidence to support this hunch. One 
can look at the experience of the Communist countries, as a sort 
of pilot scheme of forced industrialization. Taking as a group, 
they have been converted into net importers of primary products 
and net exporters of manufactures, a development whioh will itself 
be of increasing importance in the woi Id economy.
It may be argued that indu trialization is not a new factor, 
but until recently the structural changes in Communist countries 
did not greatly affect commodity markets, because their trade 
with the resffaf the world wao small. Elsewhere the effect of 
attempted industrialization on world trade has so far been limited. 
The demand for certain imported rnanufaotures has of course been 
affected, particularly textiles, but this has been offset by the 
rise in the demand for oapital equipment and vehicles.
The second new factor is that the long-term supply course of 
minerals may turn out to be rather unrealistic. One reason is 
that th/ough productivity »<ill continue to rise and new di» coveries 
will be made, there are some ores (especially iron and copper) 
whioh will grow more expensive to mine towards the end of the 
century. Another reason is that foreign direct investment is now 
discouraged by the political uncertainties of the underdeveloped 
oountries*
But if we were sure tha the t*. rms of trade of commodity 
producers would improve, it woul not follow that they should 
eschew industrialization ©. « ihey can manage without growing
aid. The real clue for , .ioy-m:J&ers9 international and national,
is that trends in the terms of trade are swamped by trends in 
volume. This was true, as we have 8r en, in the period 1928 to 
1962, and will almost certainly be true in the future. It is 
very unlikely that the terms of trade of primary producers will 
improve (or for that matter deteriorate) by more than a year 
over the long period, whereas the upward trend in the volume of 
consumption of manufactures is likely to continue to exceed that 
in the volume of consumption of primary products by something 
between 1% and 2$> a year• Indeed if the terms of trade do change 
significantly in favour of primary products, this would cause 
a still bigger divergence between the trends in volume.
One can still salvage something of the terms-of-iaade 
doctrine from this discussion.* For the divergence in volume does 
set a ceiling to the possibilities of primary production. If 
the non-industrial countries as a whole were to attempt to extend 
their production for export at the same pace as they need their 
national incomes to grow (which is at least 5% a year), they 
really would turn the terms of trade against themselves. In this 
sense, there is soraet’ ing in the thesis; but this is not how it 
is usually put, and it is now only of theoretical interest.
The correct explanation of the growing inequality in the world 
economy puts policy on a much sounder footing. (One hardly wants 
to have one’s argument upset e oh time commodity prices turn 
upwards). It also leads to more far-reaching conclusions. After 
all, if all that is .Tony with world economy’s development
is a change in relative corId correct it by devices
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such as commodity stabilisation schemes, and production controls. 
But if the cause is more fundamental, then either the structure 
of the world economy has to be changed, or an international fiscal 
system is needed. Those who cling to the torms-of-trade thesis 
do so, no doubt sub-oonsciourly, to avoid this oonclusion.
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